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Trust in World Politics: Converting “Identity” into a Source of Security through Trust-Learning 
In the discipline of International Relations (IR), the concept of trust has been an under-theorized 
concept. A number of works on trust in IR have created an uneasy compromise between the idea of 
trust and Rational Actor Model. These approaches understand trust as an instrument to further self-
interests. Contra to this “rationalist” approach, it has recently been argued that trust is necessary to 
transcend the security dilemma between individuals and social groups by building a common identity 
between them (Booth and Wheeler, 2008). This conceptual article aims to show that these 
approaches do not adequately reflect how trust operates in world politics; that trust provides a new 
way of understanding the identity-security nexus in IR. It will be argued that as actors learn to trust 
each other, this trust-learning process has a transformative affect on actors’ definition of self-
interests and identities.  
The discussion will be pursued in three sections. In the first section, the conventional 
approaches to the identity-security nexus in the areas of security dilemma and migration will be 
discussed. Their primordialist and apolitical understanding of identity will be problematized. 
Following this problematization, the security dilemma framework of Booth and Wheeler will be 
contrasted to the conventional approaches by highlighting how differently they conceptualize the 
identity-security nexus through the introduction of trust. However, the problems in the Booth and 
Wheeler’s framework, especially in relation to the conceptualization of trust in world politics, will 
also be examined. In the second section, the concept of trust will be explored. This section primarily 
focuses on the question of what trust means in world politics, how it works and its effects by 
introducing a new theoretical foundation to study and understand trust in world politics. This 
theoretical foundation will be built through the combination of Alexander Wendt’s social 
constructivism (1999) and Bill McSweeney’s sociological approach to formation of collective 
identities (1999). In the last section, the elaborated understanding of trust in the security dilemma 
will be operationalized in terms of the immigration security dilemma.   
I. Conventional Understanding of the Identity-Security Nexus: Identity as a Source of 
Insecurity 
 
a. The Identity-Security Nexus in the Areas of Security Dilemma and Migration 
The concept of ‘identity’ was (re)introduced in the discipline of IR in general, and Security Studies in 
particular, by social constructivist approaches (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; Wendt, 1999) and used 
by scholars belonging to different approaches (Campbell, 1998; Adler and Barnett, 1998; Hoogensen 
and Rottem, 2004). The analytical focus will be on two areas in parallel with the objectives of the 
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article: identity conceptualizations in the security dilemma literature and in the area of security 
dimension of migration.  
In the security dilemma literature, the concept of identity was first introduced by Barry 
Posen’s work about security dilemmas at societal level. In Posen’s analysis, the political elites of 
societies manipulate the historical enmities between ethno-religious groups, which lead to increase 
fear and insecurity for both. This motivates an ethnic group to pursue its self-security interests. 
However, this attempt results in more insecurity for the other who, as a response, tries to increase 
its own security by ethnocentric security policies. The pursuit of self-security of each ethnic group 
eventually evolves into vicious cycle of security competition (Posen, 1993). A similar perspective is 
also adopted by Stuart Kauffman (1996) with a more analytical and detailed focus on how the 
political elite manipulates the already existing fears and enmities. However, the most important 
work, which links security and identity in the security dilemma literature, belongs to Paul Roe. 
According to Roe, ethno-religious groups have different “societal identities” which are “securitized” 
by policy-makers. Attempts to increase security lead to more insecurity, eventually ethnic conflict 
(Roe, 2005).                
The securitization approach used by Roe has appealed to wider scholarship in the area of 
migration. The securitization approach is an attempt to understand how an issue is presented by 
‘securitizing’ actors, mainly decision-makers at the state-level, as an ‘existential threat’ to the societal 
identities of receiving communities (Waever et al., 1993). According to this approach, ‘securitizing’ 
political actors argue that social (read: national) identities of the receiving communities are 
challenged by immigrants, who supposedly have “different” identity (Waever, 1993; Huysmans 2000; 
Balzacq and Carrera, 2006; Boswell, 2007; Balzacq, 2008). The securitization analysis, as the 
approach’s prominent figures state, “stabilises” identities of the receiving community and the 
immigrant community to conduct a security analysis (Buzan and Waever, 1997: 243). Without such 
stabilisation, there would be no unit which can be studied as the referent of security.         
These two approaches (the societal security dilemma and the securitization of migration) 
share a particular understanding of identity as a “thing”, as put by McSweeney (1999: 73). The 
security dilemma and securitization approaches heavily rely on the idea that the societal identity has 
essential characteristics and when formed, it “freezes”. As a result, different and conflictive identities 
with their essentialist features are treated as the sources of insecurity. What is missing in these 
approaches is the role of political interests in construction and reconstruction of social identities; to 
put it differently, the fluidity of collective identities because of the political contestation over them. 
This results in treating identity ‘exogenous to political processes’ without discovering the role of 
politics on the (re)construction of particular social identities and on the marginalization of others 
(Bilgin, 2010: 83-84). The implication of this ahistorical and apolitical understanding is that identities 
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are generally understood in the primordialist and essentalist sense, which leads to the 
conceptualization of identity as a source of insecurity for social groups which have ‘different’ 
identities (ibid). However, the identity can be studied also as a source of security, if it is understood 
from the political perspective. The security dilemma framework of Booth and Wheeler offers a new 
way of approaching identity (and enables a political analysis) as a source of security by attempting to 
explore the role of trust in identity construction processes.   
b. The New Security Dilemma Framework 
The security dilemma is conventionally understood as a situation in which when an actor tries to 
improve security for itself, it creates more insecurity all around.i Challenging this understanding, for 
Booth and Wheeler, these approaches confuse “the security dilemma” with “the security paradox”, 
which refers to “a situation in which two or more actors, seeking only to improve their own security, 
provoke through their words or actions an increase in mutual tension, resulting in less security all 
around” (2008: 9, italics original).  According to their new thinking, the heart of the security dilemma 
is lemma, a Greek word for proposition, as “dilemma” is a situation in which an actor is forced to 
make a decision between “two equally balanced alternatives” (2008: 6). The security dilemma is a 
strategic predicament of an actor about how to interpret others’ intentions and capabilities and how 
to respond to them (2008: 3-4). Booth and Wheeler conceptualize three types of ideational settings 
from which choices of actors can be derived: the logics of insecurity. 
One choice of political actors can be underlined by fatalism. Fatalism foresees that when an 
actor faces insecurity in relation to another under the condition of uncertainty, it should prepare 
itself for the worst by adopting policies whose objective is to increase security ostensibly just for the 
actor itself. Fear has a key role in the formation of fatalist logic (2008: 62). Another choice is derived 
from the mitigator logic. The mitigator logic argues that insecurity can be ameliorated if actors 
choose to cooperate in order to break the vicious cycle of security competition and war. This 
depends on the ability of actors, mainly at the state-level, to develop shared norms and values. They 
ameliorate insecurity because the common norms reduce the degree of uncertainty by providing 
some level of predictability about others’ intentions (2008: 15-16). The third choice of political actors 
is shaped by the transcender logic. According to this logic, security dilemmas can be transcended if a 
new type of relationship between social groups is constructed through trust-building. Trust can be a 
choice for actors who are ready to take risks to build security for themselves and others (2008: 16-
17). 
Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma conceptualization provides important advantages for 
the students of Security Studies. The societal security dilemma approaches reduce the security 
dilemma as the action-reaction dynamics. In contrast, Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma 
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approach enables analyses which examine political actors’ ideas about security and how their ideas 
affect their choices of policies. As it brings the “choice” as the centre of the security dilemma, it 
provides a new framework to analyse the actor responsibility in the escalation of crises into the 
conflicts. Unlike the securitization approach, it enables an analysis to discover the plurality of the 
politics of security by focusing on alternative ideas and policies of security in a political structure.  
This innovative thinking has implications for studying the identity-security nexus. In the 
politics of security, different political actors have different ideas about how to make the social group 
more secure in relation to another. The choices of some aim to pursue security through ethnocentric 
(fatalist) security policies regardless others’ security needs. However, there can be other choices, 
available to political actors, which seek security for the social group with others. If political actors 
choose to act in this way (the transcender logic), a common identity between two groups who feel 
insecurity towards each other can be constructed.  
Their most crucial contribution for the purposes of this discussion is that the new security 
dilemma framework introduces trust to the security-identity nexus. They define trust as a situation 
that “actors mutually attempt to promote each other’s interests and values, including in 
circumstances that cannot be observed” (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 230). In order to transcend 
security dilemmas, trust should be embedded into the societal relations. In embedded type, trust is 
so internalized in social relationships that it is not possible to talk about separate identities: two ‘I’s 
become one ‘we’ (2008: 233). Therefore, a conceptual link between the idea of trust and identity is 
made.   
As important and innovative as their work may be, Booth and Wheeler’s trust 
conceptualization within the security dilemma framework also has problems. First, although they 
include the interest in their trust definition, they do not adequately analyse the interest dimension of 
trust-building in world politics. The questions such as what ‘interest’ means in trust relationships, 
what it differs from the one in the relations characterized by mistrust remain unanswered. Among 
them the vital question is: what kinds of effects that the trust relationship produces for the interests 
of an actor? The current analysis aims to build a stronger theoretical foundation for the role of 
interests in trust-building processes.  
Second, related to the first problem, Booth and Wheeler extensively focus on “normative” 
dimension of trust. They define the properties of trust as leap in the dark, empathy, vulnerability, 
integrity (2008: 234-245). For them, when actors trust each other, they leap in the dark by relying on 
the integrity of others and expect them not to harm their interests. This understanding is highly 
shaped Martin Hollis’ trust conceptualization (1998), which is not satisfactory for studying trust-
building processes under the conditions of insecurity in world politics. Why should an actor just leap 
in the dark and make itself vulnerable or try to empathize with others to whom it feels anxiety, fear 
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and even enmity? In this discussion, it will be argued that trust does not just appear out of normative 
considerations. Rather, actors learn to trust each other through interaction taken by small steps and 
self-interest is a key motivation in trust-building.           
The third problem is that Booth and Wheeler do not sufficiently elaborate how a trust 
relationship between two actors leads to the construction of a common identity between them. In 
fact, Booth and Wheeler’s study challenges the dominant perspective about identity in IR, which 
attempts to ‘freeze’ it for analytical purposes. Their framework enables an analysis of the role of 
trust in identity politics, albeit remains under-theorized. To explore this important relationship, the 
interest dimension of trust should be analysed further. This study aims to accomplish this by using a 
combination of the Wendtian social constructivism (1999) and the sociological approach to identity 
developed by McSweeney (1999). The parameters of the immigration security dilemma will be built 
upon this combination.       
II. Trust in World Politics: From “Trust is in my interest” to “Trust is my interest” 
 
a. The Idea of Trust 
The concept of trust has been studied by scholars from different disciplines of social sciences. In spite 
of their differences in understanding the concept, all approaches point at the idea that trust is a risky 
venture (Luhmann, 1988: 97).   
In spite of its risky character, trust has generally been considered as a valuable asset in social 
relations mainly because, as Luhmann put it, trust makes the common life possible (1979: 1). 
Without trust, individuals would solely act upon rationalist cost-benefit analysis. This results in the 
limitation of choices for individuals to actions which serve only self-interests regardless of others’ 
needs or at the expense of others’ interests. In a social system constituted and inhabited by self-
centric units assumed by the Rational Actor Model, a collective life can become almost impossible. As 
a result, “a [social] system may lose its size; it may even shrink below a critical threshold necessary 
for its own reproduction at a certain level of development” (Luhmann, 1988: 104). For Luhmann, 
trust is necessary not only for building a common life, but also for enriching it.  Hollis concurs, “we 
cannot flourish without trust” (Hollis, 1998: 4). 
As useful and necessary as it may be for the creation of the conditions of a collective life, 
individuals can be discouraged to embark upon such a venture because by developing a relationship 
based on trust, the parties of trust become more vulnerable.  The exploitation of trust can harm the 
trusting party’s interests. Then, is not trust ‘irrational’? Why would an individual make him/herself 
more vulnerable by leaving his/her interests into the custody of others? To answer these questions, 
the interest dimension of trust should be discussed.  
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According to the approach prioritizing the role of interest promotion as a motive for trust-
building, which is commonly highlighted in the trust literature, trust characterizes a social 
relationship which serves the interests of both trusting and trustee parties (Misztal, 1996; Kohn, 
2008). The interest-based definition of trust claims that two parties whose interests might be 
different can develop trust towards each other if each party adopts the other’s interests as its own 
(Hardin, 2002; Dees, 2004). Similarly, for Kohn, “trust is an expectation, or disposition to expect, that 
another party will act in one’s interests” (2008: 9). The result of a successful trust relationship is 
rewarding. By building trust, as Misztal nicely put it, “human beings, as emotional, rational and 
instrumentally oriented agents, seeking to ensure that their social relations and arrangements meet 
their emotional, cognitive and instrumental needs” (1996: 22).  
The approach focusing on the interest dimension of trust is challenged by another approach 
which prioritizes ‘normative’ side of trust-building processes (Hollis, 1998). This approach argues that 
if a trust relationship is built to further participants’ self-interests, the relationship becomes fragile 
because it can be broken when the relationship does not serve self-interests of the parties. In 
contrast, according to Hollis, trust has a normative dimension whose source lies in ‘social norms and 
moral qualities’. These norms and moral qualities construct a “bond” between individuals. Trust 
therefore becomes an expectation that others will honour this bond and “do what is right” (1998: 10-
13).     
Hollis’ criticism to the approaches which highlight the interest dimension of trust is important 
for the purposes of this article. This is mainly because many IR scholars have so far treated trust in 
the way that Hollis criticizes: trust just as an instrument to serve self-interests (see below). However, 
Hollis and IR scholars he plausibly criticizes do not sufficiently conceive the transformative effect of 
trust relationship on the definition of self-interests and identities of the trust parties.  
The interest dimension of trust deserves attention, especially when the concept is studied in 
relation to the politics where diverse interests compete to affect “who gets what, when and how” 
(Lasswell, 1935).In the conditions where a lack of trust characterizes the political relations, 
individuals pursue their self-interests as opposed to others’ interests.  This potentially conflictive 
competition can pave a way for a political structure in which each “self” should take care of 
him/herself. On the contrary, when political relations are based on trust, the individual adopts 
others’ interests as “the self”s own interests with the expectation that others will act similarly. This 
does not mean the disappearance of self-interest, rather generation of the following idea: “I pursue 
my self-interest better if I pursue the other’s interests because I trust that the other will pursue my 
interest too”.  
If no party betrays trust of the other, the trust relationship eventually itself becomes the 
shared interest of the both sides; something that both value.  In other words, they do not trust each 
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other because the trust relationship serves furthering their self-interests, but because the trust 
relationship itself becomes their self-interest. Their self-interests are re-defined through trust-
building, or through adopting each other’s interests.  If the trust relation is successful, they do not 
think that “trust is in my interest”, but that “trust is my interest”. This idea has implications for 
studying and understanding security-identity nexus in world politics. In the following section, these 
implications will be discussed.       
b. The Identity-Security Nexus with Trust   
It was previously argued that in a social system without trust, individuals act in accordance with their 
self-interests regardless of others’. S/he thinks that when others’ self-interests necessitate, they will 
exploit the trust s/he puts on them by jeopardizing his/her interests. This problem is effectively 
described by the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In the PD game, the self (-interest) is prioritized over the 
other (-interest). In this well-known game, motivated by the self-interest, both prisoners choose to 
confess and therefore, can only achieve their third-degree preference (both are sentenced). One of 
the basic assumptions of the game is that as there is no assuring mechanism between the prisoners 
to enforce the agreement on not to confess, each party’s self-interest shapes their preferences. Fack 
of trust (accompanied by a lack of an enforcing mechanism) between the prisoners results in one of 
the least preferred outcomes.  
Some scholars in IR have attempted to solve the problem exemplified by the PD by bringing 
trust into the game. However, this type of conceptualization leads to Hollis’ point: when the 
cooperation does not serve parties’ self-interests, will trust just disappear? According to the 
rationalist approach to trust, the answer is yes. Similar to Hollis, Booth and Wheeler (2008: 155) 
criticize the rationalist approach by arguing that this approach overlooks “the human factor” that is 
personal attachments and feelings between the parties.  
“The human factor” or the normative side of trust is an important dimension of trust-building 
processes. Personal attachments and compassion between actors can alleviate the process by 
encouraging actors to understand ideas and feelings of others. However, they are not sufficient 
enough to generate trust-building in world politics where actors are to trust those who do not know 
personally at best, or those with whom they share a history of enmity, fear, and insecurity at worst. 
Can inter-personal emotions adequate to enable trust at societal level, say, between ethnic groups 
who vividly feel fear towards each other? For example, was it possible to build trust between Croats 
and Serbs in 1992 in former Yugoslavia? If yes, why could not trust emerge between them? In order 
to generate trust in relation to the identity-security nexus in world politics, the interest dimension of 
trust needs to be re-visited, albeit different than it is treated in the IR literature on trust. 
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A major separation was previously made between “trust is in my interest” and “trust is my 
interest”. The former dominates the trust conceptualizations in IR literature. Actors motivated by 
their self-interests choose to ‘trust’ another because they believe that their cooperation serves to 
further their self-interests.  Their broad objective is to address the problem manifested in the PD 
game: what types of changes trust can make in the PD game and in world politics (Deutch, 1958; 
Wallace and Rothaus, 1969; Brennan, 1997). Kydd defines trust as “a belief that the other side 
prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the 
other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it” (Kydd, 2005: 6). In Kydd’s 
conceptualization, trust is a “rational” choice made by “rational” actors. In this way, trust becomes a 
property of the Rational Actor Model. 
The common pitfall in this approach is that the transformative role of trust relationship on 
actors’ interests and identities is never explored. However, a trust relationship can change actors’ 
identities and interests. The Wendtian social constructivism can explain why. According to Wendt, 
“identity” and “interest” are two main properties of actors. Properties of actors constitute behaviours 
of them. Behaviours shape an actor’s interaction with others. Their interaction constructs what 
Wendt calls “structures”, which in turn constitute an actor’s properties. In other words, there is a 
mutually constitutive relationship between actor’s properties and its behaviours. The Wendtian 
approach provides a fresh perspective to understand the role of trust in world politics.  
According to Wendt, the idea of “self-interest” changes in different structures (Wendt, 1999: 
18). The conception of self-interest in a structure underlined by the idea of ‘trust is in my interest’ is 
different from the one in a structure of ‘trust is my interest’. In the former, actors are motivated by 
the ‘self-interest’ defined by the Rational Actor Model. Trust has an instrumental value to further 
their interests. An actor makes itself vulnerable by opening its self-interests to the exploitation of 
others and at the same time it prevents itself from exploiting others’ trust. For the dominant 
approach in IR literature, this is the end of story. However, for the current discussion, it is the 
beginning. If the Wendtian approach is adopted, their trust relationship produces implications for 
their interests.  Insofar as the trust relationship is successful (no party betrays trust of another), they 
begin to construct a new structure different than the one of ‘trust is in my interest’ through 
interacting. Learning is hereby the key.  
In their interaction, actors learn to trust each other. By not harming others’ interests with the 
expectation that others will not harm its interests, the actor learns that the promotion of self-
interests is not necessarily a conflictive process that is pursued as opposed to others’. As the actor 
adopts and protects others’ interests as its own, it learns that others return its trust by protecting its 
interests. In fact, the actor learns that the other is trustworthy. If the trust relationship continues, 
actors learn more about each other’s’ interests, ideas, needs, and fears and realize that they can 
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pursue their self-interests better when they do not seek to harm each other’s interests.  Their 
interaction based on trust constructs a new structure: the structure underlined by the idea of ‘trust is 
my interest’. Following Wendt, in this structure, the definition of self-interest is different from the 
one assumed by the Rational Actor Model. Through trust, the self-interest is re-constructed in a more 
conciliatory way.                 
An implication of a new trust structure and a new “self-interest” is on the identity 
conceptualizations discussed above. As a reminder, the two approaches to identity discussed 
previously “stabilise” the social identity. In contrast, McSweeney’s approach to identity highlights the 
political contestation over collective identities. McSweeney argues that identity is not “a thing” but 
“a process of negotiation among people and interest groups” (1999: 73). Different units in a political 
structure claim and endeavour to construct alternative identities for the collectivity. These 
alternative identities reflect political groups’ interests. As a result, societal identity is subject to 
constant contestation, and therefore, it is unsolidified and non-reified and in addition, it is political.  
McSweeney’s understanding of identity explores the interest dimension in identity construction 
processes. Hence, unlike the approaches discussed above, the collective identity is not 
conceptualized by appealing to essentialist ideas (ethnicity, religion, institutional affiliation such as 
common citizenship and so on), but by analysing the interests of political actors who have alternative 
ideas about how the collective identity should be. If trust is about how to pursue interests, it will 
have implications for the character of the collective identity.      
Social groups can perceive insecurity in relation to each other. Political actors are expected to 
choose policies, among many, to address this insecurity, which put them in a security dilemma. From 
the McSweeneyian perspective, if some groups of migrants or other societal groups are considered 
as “threats” to the self-collective identity, this is mainly because of the dominant political actors. 
These political actors (state and non-state level) define the interests of the collectivity as opposed to 
and at the expense of other social groups’ interests. They claim that the self-interests of the 
collectivity can be pursued better without developing trust with others. Their conception of interests 
constitute a collective identity, which (re)construct other social groups as “threats” and as 
untrustworthy. The properties of the collectivity constitute behaviours of the social group and shape 
its interactions with others. The interactions construct a structure characterized by fear, enmity, and 
mistrust, which in turn constitute the properties. 
In contrast, if political actors conceive that the interests of the collectivity can be pursued 
better if they are able to build a trust relationship with others, a different structure can be 
constructed. These political actors adopt other social groups’ interests as their own because they 
think that they can promote their self-interests in a more efficient way; that their choices are not 
restricted to the ones which dichotomize others. They think that ‘trust is in my interest’. This is 
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similar to what Kydd calls cooperation. However, what he does not consider is the mutually 
constitute relationship between behaviours and actors’ properties.  
If the trust relationship is successful, social groups learn to trust each other. They learn that 
the other social group’s interests can co-exist with the self’s interests and that others are 
trustworthy. This trust-learning process through interaction constructs a new political structure, 
which in turn transforms the properties of the social group. The self-interest of the social group is re-
constructed in the way that it includes others interests. In this new political structure, social groups 
think that ‘trust is my interest’. Through trust-learning, the security interests of the social groups 
become more and more conflated. Social groups learn that they are not “essentially” different from 
others; but their differences, which put their self-interests in opposition, are politically constructed. 
This learning process results in the realization of the idea that a common “we” feeling can be formed 
between social groups. As a result, the security dilemma is transcended. 
How would a trust-learning relationship work in practice? The primary condition of trust-
learning is that political actors (politicians, decision-makers, publicly respected figures or civil society 
actors) should act as ‘identity entrepreneurs’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). In trust-learning process, they 
claim that the insecurity problem of the unit (self-interest of the society or the state depending on 
the level of analysis) can be dealt with through building a common identity with others. For example, 
in the case of Croat-Serb relations in the former Yugoslavia, political actors such as ‘Civic Alliance of 
Serbia’ argued for ‘Yugoslav Commonwealth’ in which a certain level of Yugoslav common identity 
would hold different ethnic groups together (Thomas, 1999: 109-117). Other identity entrepreneurs 
would be civil society actors in Serbia and Croatia which they tried to promote trust between ethnic 
groups (Devic, 1997: 190-197). Even during the civil war, especially women organisations in Serbia 
were active in this area (Hughes et.al., 1995; Bieber, 2003).  
However, trust-building activities of state and non-state actors at micro-structure level failed 
in former Yugoslavia where the political macro-structure was highly dominated by ethno-nationalist 
groups. Their logic of fatalism marginalized the alternative approach of trust-building by feeding into 
insecurity and fear of societies under the condition of uncertainty. The Yugoslav case leads to the 
point that, as put by Booth and Wheeler (2008: 245), trust is “elusive” in world politics, but this does 
not rule out the possibility of trust-learning as a way to achieve security through common identity 
building. In the last section, the issue will be re-thought in relation to one of the main security issues 
in world politics: immigration.    
III. Towards the Immigration Security Dilemma 
In this last section, an example of this new security dilemma framework will be illustrated regarding 
one of the contemporary issues in the politics of security: immigration. Before this discussion, a 
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caveat is in order. Migration is a multifaceted phenomenon. Different migrant groups can become 
different types of insecurity for the receiving societies. For example, in some societies, an immigrant 
community of particular ethnic group can be a reason of insecurity; in others, asylum-seekers from a 
neighbouring country can be considered a destabilising factor. Irregular migration has various 
dimensions, which generates insecurity for societies and states whose border regulations are 
violated. In consideration of this complexity, the following discussion only presents a sketch of the 
immigration security dilemma by drawing its broad analytical boundaries. Students of security 
studies can adjust the framework in relation to specific receiving societies and immigrant groups. 
The “immigration security dilemma” was first conceptualized by Mikhael Alekseev (2006). 
According to Alekseev, immigration security dilemmas emerge largely because of “a shadow of 
uncertainty about the intentions of immigrants” which is amplified by four factors: anarchy, 
indistinguishability between offence and defence, groupness of immigrants, and socioeconomic 
relations (2006: 21). Receiving populations with socio-economic problems may be threatened by 
immigrant populations with high in-group solidarity, whose intentions are uncertain under the 
condition of anarchy. These factors, for him, construct immigration-phobia which creates an 
immigration security dilemma. Although Alekseev’s empirical analysis provides substantial input for 
the immigration security dilemma theory, his security dilemma is an example of the security paradox. 
The immigration security dilemma below analyses choices available to actors underlined by different 
logics of insecurity. This framework brings the concept of trust into the security-identity nexus in the 
area of migration. 
Immigrant groups can become a source of insecurity for the receiving societies for a myriad 
of reasons. In order to understand these reasons, analysts can adopt “the national identity approach” 
in migration studies. The national identity approach claims that “the unique history of each country, 
its conception of citizenship and nationality, as well as debates over national identity and social 
conflicts within it, shapes immigration policies” (Meyers, 2000: 1251). The national identity approach 
focuses on “traditions” appeared historically within a country in the course of political, social and 
economic interactions (Herbert, 1990: 3).  
The national identity approach not only helps analysts explore why particular immigrant 
groups are considered as “threats” by unfolding historical/sociological/political characteristics of the 
receiving society, but also confirms the McSweeneyian perspective adopted in this discussion. The 
political contestation about national identity interacts with ideas and policies about how to solve the 
insecurity in relation to particular immigrant groups. The political actors are in an immigration 
security dilemma in relation to these groups and how they want to address the insecurity problem 
constitute a particular national identity. They face with two choices. 
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The first types of choices are underlined by the logic of fatalism. These choices aim to 
increase security of the receiving society without sufficient consideration of how these security 
policies negatively affect the immigrant groups’ security interests. Political actors who adopt the 
ethnocentric security policies have a certain conception of threated “we” versus threatening “they”. 
The self-interests of the receiving society are pursued at the expense of immigrant groups’ interests, 
as “they” are not trustworthy. Political actors assume the worst about the immigrant groups and 
produce policies to minimize the risk through exclusion and alienation.  
While some fatalism-driven policies aim to stop immigration completely, for example the 
“zero immigration policy” of France (Hollifield, 1999), others attempt to deter more immigrants 
coming. The deterrence policies can be the restriction of welfare benefits for immigrant groups such 
as those policies in the UK (Schuster and Solomos, 1999). They can also cover restrictive visa 
regulations, which, for example in the case of some European states, make asylum-seeking and 
family unification only probably ways of immigration (Boswell, 2003). Another dimension of these 
policies are about irregular migration. As some immigrants attempt to use asylum-seeking to migrate 
and settle, fatalist policies target for restrictions in the asylum systems, which negatively affect 
asylum-seekers (Guild, 2003).   
Fatalism-driven policies can be varied. Their common objective is to make the receiving 
society more secure by excluding and marginalizing some immigrant groups in relation to whom 
insecurity is perceived. The point here is not the political actors with the fatalist logic want to cause 
harm immigrants intentionally. However, their way of seeking self-security produces negative 
implications for the target groups. As the legal migration channels are restricted, some immigrants 
attempt to use the service of human smuggling networks (Brugeman, 2002). The restriction of 
welfare benefits and exclusion of some groups from the economic interaction in the society (such as 
the voucher system in the UK for asylum-seekers) push immigrants more to the fringes of the wider 
community. Therefore, fatalism-driven policies feed into the very insecurity they purport to aim: an 
attempt to generate self-security result in more insecurity for all, a security paradox. As a result, the 
“threatened self” and the “threatening other” dichotomy is (re)constructed.                     
The second choice political actors have is to build trust towards the immigrant groups and 
seek security of the receiving society through addressing the security needs of the relevant 
immigrant group. Political actors with the transcender logic adopt the immigrant groups’ interests as 
their own, with the expectation that the group will not harm the receiving society’s interests. They 
adopt the idea that “trust is in my interest”. For example, the transcender-driven policies create new 
legal channels of migration to cut down irregular migration. Considering the irregular migration in 
the EU, the EU Commission suggested a formulation of regularization mechanisms to irregular 
immigrants who came to the EU countries to seek protection or humanitarian reasons (Commission, 
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2003). Instead of building detention centres where asylum-seekers are kept, “cities of sanctuary” can 
be created. In these cities, asylum-seekers and refugees are given chance to contribute to the 
receiving society.ii Political actors formulate mechanisms through which immigrants are informed 
about the receiving society. The mentors who are ordinary members of the receiving society interact 
with an immigrant. This interaction is voluntary and based on trust.  The Time Together Program in 
the UK is an example of this mechanism.iii  
Consequences of the aforementioned actors’ efforts of trust-learning are yet to be seen. If 
the trust relationship is successful, their interaction leads to the transformation of the receiving 
society’s properties, or its interests and identity. Political actors at the state and EU levels are 
enabled to conceive that the security interests of the society do not necessarily require exclusion or 
marginalization of immigrant groups. They believe that the security of the receiving society does not 
have to result in insecurity of the immigrant groups. Political actors can think that “trust is my 
interest”. The immigration security dilemma can be eventually transcended. 
            
Conclusion 
The concept of trust was first introduced to the security dilemma theorizing by Booth and Wheeler 
(2008). This article took the Booth and Wheeler’s work as a starting point and aims to elaborate their 
conceptual discussion about how trust contributes to the construction of common identities by 
presenting a stronger theoretical foundation. While accepting the interest as the focal point of trust 
in world politics, it was argued that trust can be a way to generate security by constructing a 
common identity when actors feel insecurity towards others under the condition of uncertainty, or 
put it simply, when they are in a security dilemma. This argument was built upon the assumption that 
trust relationship has a transformative effect on actors’ interests and identities.  This transformative 
role was explained through a new theoretical foundation. Strengthened by this theoretical 
foundation, a new security dilemma was illustrated in relation to migration as a contemporary 
matter of security. 
Two main conclusions about trust can be derived from the discussion: trust as analytical 
concept and trust as a political idea. Trust as the analytical concept has been under-theorized in IR. 
The current dominant accounts are rather limited in understanding the role of trust. An alternative 
approach of Booth and Wheeler represents a new understanding, although it needs theoretical 
elaboration regarding the implication of trust-building on the identity-security nexus. This study has 
shown that this theoretical foundation can be constructed by a combination of the Wendtian social 
constructivism and the McSweeneyian sociological approach to identity. Trust as a political idea 
highlights that trust becomes possible only if political actors realize the potential of the idea to 
generate self-security with other social groups, not as opposed to others. As trust-building is related 
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to how the collective identity can be constructed, there is a political contestation about it as well. As 
briefly highlighted above in the immigration security dilemma, fatalist and transcender choices co-
exist in political structures.  Which one prevails is a matter of politics.  
        
 References 
Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett, 1998. ‘A Framework for the Study of Security Communities’, 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.) The Security Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (29-65). 
 
Alekseev, Mikhail, 2006. Immigration Phobia and Security Dilemma. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Balzacq, Thierry & Sergio Carrera, eds., 2006. Security versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s 
Future. Hampshire: Ashgate.  
 
Balzacq, Thierry, 2008. ‘The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and 
Interior Policies’, Journal of Common Market Studies 46(1): 75-100. 
 
Bilgin, Pinar, 2010. ‘Identity/Security’, Peter J. Burgess (ed.), Handbook of New Security Studies 
London: Routledge, (81-89). 
 
Bieber, Florian, 2003. ‘The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in 
Serbia’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 17(1): 73-90.    
 
Booth, Ken & Nicholas Wheeler, 2008. The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World 
Politics. Hampshire: Palgrave and Macmillan. 
 
Boswell, Christian, 2003. European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and 
Exclusion. London: Blackwell.  
 
Boswell, Christina, 2007. ‘Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization’, Journal of Common Market Studies 45(3): 589-610.  
 
Brennan, Geoffrey, 1997. Democratic Trust: A Rational Choice Theory View. University of Exeter Rusel 
Working Papers no. 29. 
 
Bruggeman, W., 2002.  Illegal Immigration and Trafficking in Human Beings seen as a Security 
Problem for Europe, 
<http://www.belgium.iom.int/STOPConference/Conference%20Papers/20%20Bruggeman%20Brusse
ls%20IOM.19.09.02.pdf> [accessed 07 July 2009] 
 
Butterfield, Herbert, 1951. History and Human Relations. London: Collins. 
 
Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever, 1997. ‘Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The 
Copenhagen School Replies’, Review of International Studies 23(2): 241-250.  
 
Campbell, David, 1994. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
15 
 
 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of Regions 
on Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM(2003) 336 Final, p. 26. 
 
Dees, Richard H., 2004. Trust and Toleration London: Routledge. 
 
Deutch, Morton, 1958. ‘Trust and Suspicion’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2(4): 265-279. 
 
Devic, Ana, 1997. ‘Anti-War Initiatives and the un-Making of Civic Identities in the Former Yugoslav 
Republics’, Journal of Historical Sociology 10(2): 127-156. 
Hoogensen, Gunhild and Svein Vigeland Rottem, 2004. ‘Gender Identity and the Subject of Security’, 
Security Dialogue 35(2): 155-171. 
 
Huysmans, Jef, 2000. ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 38(5): 751-777. 
 
Hardin, Russell, 2002. Trust and Trustworthiness. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Herbert, U. 1990. A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press. 
 
Hollis, Martin, 1998. Trust Within Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hughes, Donna M. Lepa Mladjenovic and Zorica Mrsevic, 1995. ‘Feminist Resistance in Serbia’, 
European Journal of Women’s Studies 2(4): 509-532.  
 
Jervis, Robert, 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Kaufman, Stuart, 1996. ‘An International Theory of Inter-Ethnic War’, Review of International Studies 
22: 149-171. 
 
Keck, M.E. and K.Sikkink, 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Kohn, Marek, 2008. Trust: Self-Interest and the Common Good. London: Oxford. 
 
Kydd, Andrew, 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Lapid, Yosef and Frederick Kratochwil, 1996. ‘“Revisiting the “National”: Toward an Identity Agenda in 
Neorealism’,  Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (eds) The Return of Culture in IR Theory. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner (105–126). 
 
Lasswell, Harold D., 1935. Politics: Who Gets What, When and How. New York, London: Whittlesey 
House.  
 
Luhmann, Niklas, 1979. Trust and Power. Chichester: Wiley. 
 
16 
 
Luhmann, Niklas, 1988. ‘Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives’, David Gambetta, 
ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (94-107). 
 
McSweeney, Bill, 1999. Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Meyers, Eytan, 2000. ‘Theories of International Immigration Policy – A Comparative Analysis’, 
International Migration Review 34(4): 1245-1282. 
 
Misztal, Barbara, 1996. Trust in Modern Societies: the Search for the Basis of Social Order. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Mitzen, Jennifer, 2006. ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security 
Dilemma’, European Journal of International Relations 12(3): 341-370.   
 
Posen, Barry, 1993. ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival 35(1): 27-47. 
 
Roe, Paul, 2005. Societal Security Dilemma. London: Routledge. 
 
Schuster, Lisa and John Solomos, 1999. ‘The Politics of Refugee and Asylum Policies in Britain: 
Historical Patterns and Contemporary Realities’, Alica Bloch and Carl Levy (eds.) Refugees, Citizenship 
and Social Policy in Europe. London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin Press (51-75). 
 
Tang, Shiping, 2010. ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: toward a dynamic and integrative 
theory of ethnic conflict’, Review of International Studies 37(2): 511-536. 
 
Thomas, Robert, 1999. Serbia under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990s. London: Husty and Company. 
 
Waever, Ole, 1993. ‘The Societal Security’, Barry Buzan, OleWaever, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre 
Lemaitre, eds., Identity, Migration and New Security Agenda in Europe. London : Pinter Publishers 
(17-40).  
 
Wallace, Donnel & Paul Rothaus, 1969. ‘Communication, Group Loyalty and Trust in the Prisoner 
Dilemma Game’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 13(3): 370-380. 
 
Wendt, Alexander, 1999.  Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
                                                          
i This definition is not exclusive, although it is generally accepted by the students of IR. One approach, which 
was proposed by Robert Jervis (1976), claims that intentions of actors (whether they are offensive or defensive 
in intent) are important in security dilemmas. Based on this distinction, he proposed the spiral model (actors 
with defensive intentions) and the deterrence model (at least one actor has offensive intentions) (Jervis, 1976: 
58-113). Following Jervis, for example, Roe formulates three types of societal security dilemmas. In two of 
them (tight and regular), actors have defensive intentions; in one of them (loose), actors have aggressive 
intentions (2005: 73). The conceptualization of the security dilemma based on differing intentions, however, is 
not without a challenge. First, Mitzen (2006) argues that actors sometimes define themselves in terms of the 
security dilemma they are in so whether they have offensive or defensive intentions does not essentially 
matter because the security dilemma is about their “ontological security”. Second, Tang (2010) problematizes 
the intention-based approach by arguing that a “security dilemma” between actors with offensive intentions is 
not a security dilemma at all. Following Butterfield (1951: 19-21), he argues that in security dilemmas, actors 
must have defensive intentions.      
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ii City of Sanctuary Website, <http://www.cityofsanctuary.org/resources/criteria> 
iii Time Together Website, <http://www.timetogether.org.uk/about_us.php> 
